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How to be a Scientific Realist: 





To the memory of Herbert Feigl


We are learning to be at home in the world, not by misrepresenting it, but by understanding it.

Wendell T. Bush 1923

1.	Introduction
What is it to be committed to the reality of the (typically invisible) entities that scientific theories posit to explain the observable phenomena? For the most part, empiricists have felt uncomfortable with this question. With the basic empiricist credo in place, viz., that all substantive knowledge should be grounded in experience, the question above becomes a question about how, if at all, (commitment to) the reality of theoretical entities can be licensed by whatever is given in experience. This is an issue concerning the relation between the entities posited by scientific theory and the data of perception through which they are given; which, of course, is not unresolvable. But isn’t the very idea of the reality of some entities (or of the external world as a whole or whatever) a metaphysical chimera of the sort that empiricists have always shown disdain for? The tension was acutely felt by the Logical Positivists. On the one hand, there is the Scylla of metaphysical realism (at least when it affirms that the reality of theoretical entities is transcendent—disconnected from any possibility of knowing them); on the other hand, there is the Charybdis of instrumentalism (at least when it denies the reality of theoretical posits). 
The thought, then, that there is a way to reconcile empiricism with a realist stance towards scientific theories, avoiding instrumentalism and without fearing that this will lead straight to metaphysics, becomes very promising. This paper aims to articulate this thought. It revives and develops an empiricist tradition that takes it to be the case that empiricism need not be characterised by ‘phobia of the invisible and the intangible’ as Herbert Feigl once put it—after all, this phobia would be uncharacteristic of the empiricist spirit precisely because it takes something other than science—say some philosophical prejudices—as a guide to what there is in the world. 
The paper consists of two parts. The first (sections 2 and 3) will articulate how empiricism can go for scientific realism without metaphysical anxiety. It will draw on the work of Moritz Schlick, Hans Reichenbach and Feigl to develop an indispensability argument for the adoption of the realist framework. This argument, unlike current realist arguments, has a pragmatic ring to it: there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist framework. The guiding thought here is that fundamental ontic questions are not dealt with in the same way in which questions about the reality of ordinary entities (be they stones or electrons) are dealt with—the ontic framework must already be in place before questions about the reality of specific entities are raised. The second part (sections 4 and 5) will articulate reasons for avoiding instrumentalism. Most space is given in offering reasons to refrain from adopting P. Kyle Stanford’s (2006) neo-instrumentalism—a very sophisticated version of instrumentalism that seems to work within the realist framework and promises empiricists a way to avoid scientific realism. Scientific realism is alive and well because of Ti(a)na: there is (almost) no alternative. However, in section 6, it will be argued that there is room for rapprochement between contextualist instrumentalism and scientific realism. The paper is accompanied by an appendix in which Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism is presented and discussed.

2. Between Instrumentalism and Metaphysics
In his Positivism and Realism, Schlick tried to find a way to steer clear from both instrumentalism and metaphysics by advocating what came to be known as empirical realism. Ironically, the verificationist criterion of meaning was meant to secure the possibility of a middle ground: theoretical entities are real since statements about them are verified (in principle) in the same way as statements about observables (cf. 1932, 101). Schlick does insist that verification by reference to the given is the touchstone of meaningfulness, but he also stresses it’s a gross misunderstanding to claim that what follows from this is that “only the given is real” (1932, 104). Schlick seems to take verifiability-in-principle as the criterion of reality (see his example of the nucleus on pp. 88-9)—thereby conflating between the evidence there is (or might be) for the reality of an entity and the reality of this entity—a point forcefully made by Feigl (1950). However, Schlick’s empirical realism rests on a literal understanding of scientific theories—theoretical statements are not re-interpreted; nor are they reduced to whatever can be captured by the data of perception. Be that as it may, the relevant point is that his critique of metaphysics (and in particular his critique of metaphysical realism which demands a more robust sense in which theoretical entities are real and independent of the mind, subjective points of view etc.) leaves the world as described by science entirely intact—a world populated by atoms and fields and whatever else our best science tells there is. Science advances by revealing the constituents of things that we encounter in perception and the fact that these are (typically) invisible is no reason to suppose they are not real. And not just that. Empirical realism (or consistent empiricism, as Schlick calls it) is nothing like the philosophy of as-if (theoretical entities are real and not merely useful fictions); nor, of course, is it committed only to the empirical adequacy of theories (see Schlick’s brief comment on Copernicus vs Ptolemy on p. 105). 
	The middle ground that Schlick explores is not yet fully developed—it is Reichenbach (1938—see the appendix) and Herbert Feigl (1950) that render it a proper philosophical stance. But the point so far is clear: an empiricist need not be either an instrumentalist or subscribe to a heavyweight metaphysical account of the reality of the world that science describes. And yet, an empiricist can be committed to the reality of theoretical entities and hence be a scientific realist. What is the argument for this sort of stance towards science? 

3. The Realist Framework
Scientific realism rests on a Copernican turn, as Feigl has aptly put it. Whereas empiricism claimed that the object of science should be made to fit within the object of perception, realism should take the object of perception to fit within the object of science. Better put, perception is epistemically special because it is through this that human beings get to know what the world is like, but the data of perception (as well as the perceivers) are part of the physical world and the question is how they fit into the physical world. As Feigl put it: “The Copernican turn then consists in relating the observer to the observed, the indicator to the indicated,—not epistemically,—but so to speak cosmologically” (1950, 41). 
	What is the argument for this turn? Unlike Kant’s own, the realist Copernican turn is not based on a transcendental argument—the claim is not that without realism science would not be possible etc. The scientific realist framework is the framework that takes science (and scientific theories) as dealing, among other things, with real (though typically unobservable) entities as constituents of the commonsensical entities and as aiming—and, plausibly, succeeding—in explaining and predicting the causal-nomological behaviour, and the properties, of commonsensical entities in terms of them. The argument for the adoption of this frame (that is, for the Copernican turn) is that it is indispensable for achieving maximum causal and nomological coherence in our image of the world and—something which is dear to instrumentalism too—maximum predictability and control over nature. What is more, the realist frame does not leave the world of experience intact. When necessary, it corrects it “from above”, as Feigl put it. It corrects empirical laws and it explains why certain objects fail to obey certain empirical laws.​[1]​
The driving force behind the Copernican turn is an indispensability argument: theoretical entities are indispensable. But some care is needed here. This indispensability argument works only relative to accepting a certain view of what science is and what it aims at. Nothing is indispensable simpliciter. Some things (that is, commitment to the reality of some entities) might be indispensable for a certain purpose or aim. To say that theoretical entities are indispensable is to say that there cannot be (weaker: it’s unlikely that there are) ways to fulfil certain aims (advancement of attractive theories, explanation of observable phenomena, predictions of further observable phenomena, development of a unified causal-nomological image of the world) which dispense with positing theoretical entities.
It’s important to distinguish between the realist frame and ordinary scientific theories. The Copernican turn has to do with a way of viewing the world: as having a deep structure which grounds/explains its surface structure, i.e., the way it is revealed to cognizers through their sensory modalities. The adoption of the frame implies commitment to theoretical entities and to a causal-nomological network through which their presence explains and corrects the way the world reveals itself to humans (and other animals). It does not dictate commitment to any specific scientific theory. This is a matter that has to do with the evidence there is for or against scientific theories. What it does dictate, however, is that scientific theories that ostensibly introduce new types of entity should be taken as doing exactly that, viz., as positing entities that explain and predict the behaviour of observables. It can then be said that the Copernican turn is supplemented with two interesting further points. The first is a criterion of reality: that is real which is required within the causal-nomological frame of science. The second is a criterion for acceptance (or justified belief, if you like): whatever hypotheses are confirmed within this frame are our best candidates for justified belief as to what the world is like. These two points suggest the following: scientific realism asserts the reality of theoretical entities, but which entities we have reason to believe are real is a function of the degree of confirmation of scientific theories. 
In what sense are theoretical entities independently existing entities? ‘Independent existence’ here is primarily conceived of as existence in its own right, that is irreducible existence. Explanatory posits are not anything else: they are not complexes of data of perception; nor façon de parler, nor useful fictions and the like. Commitment to this kind of independence is licensed by the fact that theories have ‘excess content’ over whatever could be described in a purely observational language and that they are indispensable in explaining why the observable phenomena are the way they are. This might not be taken to be a heavyweight conception of independence. But a) that’s precisely the point, viz., that this notion of independence is strong enough to secure commitment to the reality of theoretical entities without creating further metaphysical anxieties; and b) taken in association with the Copernican turn, it does highlight the fact that reality is not constrained by what can be known but by what is required to restore causal-nomological unity to the world. What is thereby required, viz., explanatory posits, has independent existence (that is, independence from the knowing subject) precisely because the issue has now been reversed: we are not worried about how theoretical entities fit into the world of knowers; rather we are worried about how knowers get access to the world as described by scientific theories.
Feigl argued that the adoption of the realist frame is not based on the same considerations on which adoption of certain scientific theories is based. The reason is that the adoption of scientific theories is based—by and large—on their degree of confirmation (that is, on how likely they are given the available evidence). But it does not make sense to talk about the degree of confirmation of the realist frame; the latter should already be in place for the degree of confirmation of certain theories to be possible. In other words, we cannot even start talking about the probability that there are electrons, or quarks or whatever unless we have already adopted the frame of theoretical entities. Feigl claimed that the adoption of the realist frame is, ultimately, a matter of convention: it is based on a decision to expand the conceptual framework through which we theorise about the world.​[2]​
Is all this a big concession on the part of realism? Not necessarily. The key point so far is two-fold: a) that the adoption of the realist framework is not based on the same type of argument as the adoption of ordinary scientific theories; and b) that the realist framework is not forced on us either by a priori reasoning or by any empirical facts. This implies that there is an element of choice in adopting realism. But given that the a certain aim is chosen, the choice is constrained. The realist framework is indispensable if certain aims are to be achieved or if certain desiderata (some of which might well be dear to its rivals) are to be satisfied. As Grover Maxwell (1962) suggested, a condition of adequacy for a framework suitable for the development of scientific theories is that it should be able to offer explanations of the phenomena. 
There is nothing particularly conventional in the claim that the realist framework does this job in the best way.
	All this is, obviously, relevant to the status of the so-called no miracles argument. As is well-known, Putnam (and following him Boyd, and following him myself) took realism to be a theory and in particular an empirical theory that gets supported by the success of science because it best explains this success. There are quite interesting differences between the exact ways in which Putnam, Boyd and myself conceived of this argument; but the overarching common thought was that realism (as a theory) gets supported by the relevant evidence (the success of science) in the very same way in which first-order scientific theories get supported by the relevant evidence. But scientific realism is not a theory; it’s a framework which makes possible certain ways of viewing scientific theories. Scientific realism lacks all the important features of a scientific theory. Even if we thought we could reconstruct scientific realism as a theory for the purposes of epistemology of science, we had better follow Feigl and say: “you can view ordinary realism in analogy to scientific theories, but be careful in doing so!”. The problem lies in the thought that scientific realism can be supported by the same type of argument that scientific theories are supported. This is a tempting thought. But it is flawed, I now think. The reason for this claim is that the very idea of counting empirical success as being in favour of the truth of a scientific theory—the very idea of evidence making a theory probable, or the very idea that a theory is the best explanation of the evidence, and the like—presupposes that theories are already placed within the realist framework. For the no-miracles argument to work at all it is presupposed that explanation—and in particular explanation by postulation—matters and that scientific theories should be assessed and evaluated on explanatory grounds. Hence, the no-miracles argument works within the realist framework; it’s not an argument for it.​[3]​ It presupposes rather than establishes the realist frame. Still, within the realist framework, the no-miracles argument has an important role to play, and this, as I have argued in my (1999), is to offer a vindication of inference to the best explanation. This will be rule-circular vindication, but this is a) non-vicious and b) inescapable.​[4]​
	With all this in mind, we can say that the adoption of the scientific realist is based on the indispensability of theoretical entities for the explanation of observable phenomena and for achieving maximum causal and nomological coherence in our image of the world. Theoretical entities are indispensable for the causal unity of the world. Theoretical entities ensure enhanced predictability of, and control over, nature. Their presence makes a difference to what can be predicted (see the case of novel predictions), to what kinds of interventions can happen in the world (see the manipulations of theoretical entities in controlled experiments) and to what corrections can be made to empirically established regularities. But precisely because one can dismiss all these conditions and simply choose to adopt a rival framework within which questions about the reality of theoretical entities drop out altogether, there is no ultimate argument for scientific realism. 
	One might wonder: are then theoretical entities really real? To this my own reply cannot match Sellars’s (1976, 312): 

Philosophers many years ago amused themselves with the question: Are scientific objects invented or discovered? To this the correct answer is that we invent them and discover that they do the work we require of something that is to count as real.

All this is not to imply that scientific realism and instrumentalism are on a par. Showing this will be the subject of the next sections.

4. Varieties of Instrumentalism
Instrumentalism is a broad church. John Dewey, who I think coined the term, took it to be the view licensed by pragmatism. For him the problem was the relation of the “conceptual objects” of science to the things of ordinary experience. Dewey seems to have favoured some kind of contextualism: reality is not an absolute category firmly attributed to some entities and firmly denied to some other. As he put it: “That the table as a perceived table is an object of knowledge in one context as truly as the physical atoms, molecules, etc. are in another situational context and with reference to another problem is a position I have given considerable space to developing” (1939, 537). The context and the problem are determined, at least partly, by the things one does with an entity and by the role an entity plays within a system—one cannot put books on swarm of molecules, as he says. One may well question—as Reichenbach (1939) did—the motivation for this view (since it is not clear, to say the least—how contexts are separated). But here, in any case, is a variant of instrumentalism that does not reduce theories to calculating devices and does not deny that (in a sense, at least) explanatory posits are real. 
This is denied by the stricter form of instrumentalism defended by Philipp Frank (1932), who took it that the aim of science is prediction and that theories are merely tools for this aim—in particular, symbolic tools that do not (aim to) represent the real world. Theories, for Frank, are neither true nor false; they have only instrumental value that is cashed in terms of predictions of future observations on the basis of present ones. Let us call this non-cognitivist instrumentalism. 
No-one can take seriously any more non-cognitivist instrumentalism. The reason is simply that, judged by its fruits, it does a very poor job even when it comes to explaining how prediction and control are possible. One important argument against  non-cognitivism (of the sort espoused by Frank) is that it is a reconstruction of science that turns a perfectly meaningful practice—where there is communication and understanding—into a meaningless manipulation of symbols underlied by problematic and context-dependent rules that connect some of the symbols with experience (and hence give them some partial meaning). More importantly, however, non-cognitivist instrumentalism offers a causally disconnected image of the world. Given its way of reading the theoretical superstructure of theories, it’s not even possible that the observable phenomena are connected to each other via processes and mechanisms that involve unobservable entities. The problem here is not that causal laws become very complicated by being meant to connect only observable magnitudes. Rather, the problem is that causal laws become arbitrary, since they are after all formulated by means of symbols such that, were they to be taken literally would refer to unobservable entities, but, being not-taken literally, there is simply no fact of the matter as to whether these or other (incompatible) causal laws describe the workings of nature, provided that they are all co-ordinated in the appropriate manner with observables.
Nowadays, there are some aspects of the realist framework that are widely accepted. There is little doubt that theories should be read literally; that they purport to refer to theoretical entities; that scientific methodology is theory-driven; that positing theoretical entities is indispensable for formulating a powerful and simple system of laws; that scientific theories aim at explanation; that explanation best proceeds by postulating theoretical entities; etc. These aspects of the realist framework are so widely accepted that they are taken to constitute (a central) part of the phenomenology of science: any adequate epistemic stance towards science should show accommodate these aspects of the phenomenology of science. Where there is resistance, of course, is in the thought that these aspects of the phenomenology of science commit us to the adoption of the full realist framework—that is, the reality of theoretical entities. 
	What ways are there for denying commitment to the reality of theoretical entities, while entertaining a non-revisionist stance towards the phenomenology of science? The issue I am interested in is not denying the reality of electrons, or fields, or DNA molecules, but denying the very idea of being committed to the world’s having a deep structure. 
One familiar way is to go for constructive empiricism: to claim that offering a coherent account of the phenomenology science and a criterion of success does not require accepting the reality of theoretical entities; it is enough to accept that scientific theories are empirically adequate. From this point of view, theories describe possible ways the world might be (and in particular, they describe the world as having some deep structure which is causally connected to the structure of appearances), and theorists employ theories making full use of their recourses in explaining and predicting the phenomena, but this does not imply commitment to the reality of theoretical entities—this very issue, van Fraassen says, is bracketed. A lot has been said about constructive empiricism and I do not intent to add anything new here; just a quick thought. It seems that Constructive Empiricism lacks a criterion of reality. We have seen that scientific realism (in the way developed in this paper) presents us with a cogent criterion of reality. Forget about the cogency; it is a criterion of reality. What is the alternative that we are invited to adopt if we accept constructive empiricism? It might be thought that constructive empiricism disposes of this question as moot. But that’s not quite right. It is committed to the reality of the observable entities. This commitment is not based on the fact that they are observable. It’s not observability that licenses reality; and it’s not (further) that unobservability licenses unreality. Without an explicit criterion of what it is for an entity to be real we are left in the dark as to a) why we should be committed to the reality of the objects of common sense but b) why we should (need) not be committed to theoretical entities. Here again, the issue is not that there might not be electrons and the like; the issue is that short of showing that positing theoretical entities is dispensable for accounting for the phenomenology of science, we have been given no reason not to be committed to their reality. 
	A different way to advance some instrumentalist denial of the realist framework is to adopt some kind of error-theoretic approach towards the reality of theoretical entities. This way will grant the phenomenology of science and the usefulness (even the indispensability) of employing theoretical concepts, but will also assert that scientific theories are in massive error in that there are no theoretical entities. I am not sure someone holds this position about science. But it is an odd position to adopt. In the case of mathematics and ethics, there is at least a prima facie plausible way to deny the reality of numbers or moral principles (or facts): they are supposed to be abstract entities, outside the causal-nomological net of science. Theoretical entities, on the contrary, are concrete entities that play certain causal roles and hold together the causal-nomological net posited by science. Declaring their unreality would then require a different sort of argument; it would presuppose a criterion of reality that licences objects of common sense but blocks theoretical entities. 
Though error-theoretic instrumentalism denies the reality of theoretical entities, it should accept that it is at least possible that there are such entities and are part of the furniture of the world. So there is a possible world W in which there are theoretical entities in addition to whatever entities (let’s call them OK-entities) the instrumentalist thinks there are in W. Let us also assume that the actual world @ is like W vis-à-vis all OK-entities, but there are no theoretical entities in @. In W, but not in @, the theoretical entities are causally connected with the OK-entities, explain and predict their behaviour etc. How can error-theoretic instrumentalists tell that @ is not like W? Barring an agnostic attitude, they should be able to show that all theoretical commitments in @ are dispensable, that is that there is a description of the OK-entities in @ such that it implies no commitments to theoretical entities. Given Craig’s theorem, this is in principle possible. But as is well known, there is no way to capture all aspects of the phenomenology of science by replacing theories with their Craig-reformulation. Here again, this is not an ultimate argument against error-theoretic instrumentalism but it seems strong enough to condemn it.​[5]​  

5. Stanford to the Rescue
Stanford (2006) has advanced a very sophisticated neo-instrumentalist alternative to scientific realism. In fact, it is so sophisticated that it does not deny the realist framework. It seems that it tries to level a charge against scientific realism within the realist framework, by drawing a line between those parts of the framework that there is an independent route of epistemic access and we should not be instrumentalists about and those parts of the framework (mostly related to fundamental theories) that should be seen as “powerful conceptual tools for action and guides to further inquiry rather than accurate descriptions of how things stand in otherwise inaccessible domains of nature” (2006, 24-5). 
	This may be seen as contextualist instrumentalism (in important respects different from Dewey’s). Stanford goes as far as to suggest it may well be a mistake to try to identify “a crucial difference” between instrumentalism and realism when it comes to the epistemic attitudes they recommend towards theories or theoretical assertions.  He proposes that there is at most “a local difference in the specific theories each is willing to believe on the strength of the total evidence available” (2006, 205). I think this kind of attempt at reconciliation is welcome and I will try to say something in its favour in section 6. But Stanford’s own way to achieve this reconciliation, while keeping a distinguished instrumentalist outlook, is flawed—in ways that jeopardise his own project.

5.1 NI vs PI
Stanford starts with a bold claim, viz., that at any given stage of inquiry there have been hitherto unconceived radically distinct alternatives to extant scientific theories such that a) they are equally well-confirmed by the available evidence and b) they come to be formulated and accepted by scientists in due course, thereby replacing exiting theories. This is a situation that he calls “Recurrent Transient Underdetermination”. In its face, we are told, belief in (the truth of)  theories that are subject to this predicament is never warranted. But Stanford also thinks that all fundamental scientific theories in a variety of domains of inquiry are in this predicament. His New Induction over the history of science is supposed to ground the claim that we have good inductive reason to believe that for any theory scientists will come up with—and for any evidence that will be available—there will be hitherto unconceived subsequent theories that will be at least as well confirmed as the ones currently available. This predicament is supposed to be the springboard for breathing new life into instrumentalism. It promises to show that (there are good reasons to believe that) fundamental theories are not accurate descriptions of the deep structure of the world but rather “powerful conceptual tools for action and guides to further inquiry” (2006, 24-5). 
	Even if we were to grant this predicament, it would pose its intended problem to realism only if taken in tandem with the Pessimistic Induction (PI). Unless PI is correct, the New Induction (NI) does not suffice to show that new theories will be radically dissimilar to the superseded ones. So rehabilitating PI is an important step of Stanford’s strategy. It’s obvious, I think, that there is a tension between PI and NI. At least on the standard reading of it, PI is supposed to establish, on inductive grounds, that current successful theories are (likely to be) false—because all (or most) past successful theories have been false. But what NI, if successful, establishes is that there are inductive reasons to be agnostic about the (approximate) truth of current successful theories. What then is the recommended attitude towards current theories: disbelief or agnosticism? Arguably, this makes a difference. Agnosticism is more open-minded—it leaves more options open. Disbelief, on the other hand, is hardly reconcilable with using the full content of an assertion as a guide to action. 
 
5.1.1 Resisting PI’s Rehabilitation
This last point is, if anything, a superficial wound to Stanford’s strategy. A deeper wound, I think, is caused by examining his attempt to rehabilitate PI. Since this is not my main concern in this paper, I shall be brief and sketchy. 
Recent realist responses to PI have aimed to show that there are ways to distinguish between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ parts of past abandoned theories and to show that the ‘good’ parts—those that enjoyed evidential support, were not idle components and the like—were retained in subsequent theories. This kind of response aims to show that there has been enough theoretical continuity in theory-change to warrant the realist claim that science is ‘on the right track’. This kind of response damages (at least partly) Stanford’s unconceived alternatives gambit. If there is convergence in our scientific image of the world, the hitherto unconceived theories that will replace the current ones won’t be the radical rivals they are portrayed to be. This argument from convergence (which is the thrust of the current realist responses to PI) does not establish that current theories are true, or likely to be true. Convergence there may be and yet the start might have been false. If successful, this argument puts before us a candidate for explanation. There is then a further claim, viz., that the generation of an evolving-but-convergent network of theoretical assertions is—arguably—best explained by the assumption that this network consists of approximately true assertions.​[6]​ Here again, this is an argument within the realist framework and not an argument for the framework. Stanford’s main objection to this convergence argument (see chapter 7) is that it is tailor-made to suit the realist. He claims that it is the fact that the very same present theory is used both to identify which parts of past theories were empirically successful and which parts were (approximately) true that accounts for the realists’ wrong impression that these parts coincide. He (2006, 166) says: 

With this strategy of analysis, an impressive retrospective convergence between our judgements of the sources of a past theory’s success and the things it ‘got right’ about the world is virtually guaranteed: it is the very fact that some features of a past theory survive in our present account of nature that leads the realist both to regard them as true and to believe that they were the sources of the rejected  theory’s success or effectiveness. So the apparent convergence of truth and the sources of success in past theories is easily explained by the simple fact that both kinds of retrospective judgements have a common source in our present beliefs about nature.

I find this kind of objection misguided. The way I see it, the problem is this. There are the theories scientists currently believe (say endorse, it does not matter) and there are the theories that were believed (endorsed) in the past. Some (but not all) of them were empirically successful (perhaps for long periods of time). They were empirically successful irrespective of the fact that, subsequently, they were replaced by others. This replacement was a contingent matter that had to do with the fact that the world did not co-operate: some predictions failed; or the theory became very ad hoc or complicated in its attempt to accommodate anomalies, or what have you. Surely, this does not cancel out the empirical success. Even if scientists had somehow failed to come up with new theories, the old theories would not have ceased to be successful. So success is one thing, replacement is another. Hence it is one thing to inquire into what features of some past theories accounted for their success and it is quite another to ask whether these features were such that they were retained in subsequent theories of the same domain. These are two independent issues and they can be dealt with (both conceptually and historically) independently. They can be mixed up, of course. A (somewhat) careless realist could start with current theories and then tell a story about the abandoned ones which ensures that part of what scientists now endorse about the world was present in the past theories and responsible for their successes. But realists needn’t be careless. We can start with the past theories and try—on independent grounds, that is, bracketing the question of their replacement—to identify the sources of their empirical success. This won’t be easy, but there is no principled reason to think it cannot be done, unless of course one thinks that when a test is made the whole of theory is indiscriminately implicated in it—but this is no more than a slogan. When this is done, that is when a theory has been, as it were, anatomised, we can then ask the independent question of whether there is any sense in which the sources of success of a past theory that the anatomy has identified are present in our current theories. It’s not, then, that the current theory is the common source for the identification of the (approximately) true parts of an old theory and of its successful parts. Current theory is the vantage point from which we examine old ones—could there be any other?—but the identification of the sources of success of past theories need not be accounted for from this vantage point. 
In effect, the realist strategy proceeds in two steps. The first is to make the claim of convergence plausible, viz., to show that there is continuity in theory-change and that this is not merely empirical continuity; substantive theoretical claims that featured in past theories and played a key role in their successes (especially novel predictions) have been incorporated (perhaps somewhat re-interpreted) in subsequent theories and continue to play an important role in making them empirically successful. This first step, I take it, is common place, unless we face a conspiracy of the scientific community to make us believe that every time a new theory is devised and endorsed scientists do not start from square one (though they actually do). As noted above, this first step does not establish that the convergence is to the truth. For this claim to be made plausible a second step is needed, viz., that the emergence of this stable network of theoretical assertions is best explained by the assumption that is, by and large, approximately true. The distinctness of these two steps shows that Stanford’s criticism is misguided.​[7]​ 
For the sake of the argument, let us suppose Stanford is right. Would his point be as damaging as he thinks?  Compare: John used a map to get to the shelter (I know he did get there), but the map was wrong (at least partly), since he did try to get to the water source but he failed. I produce another map. I use it and I go both to the shelter and the water source. Then, I retrospectively use the information in my map to identify the parts of the map that John used that were correct and I also explain—by this information—how he managed to get to the shelter (that is, how this information enabled him to get to the shelter). What exactly is wrong with this? (Apart from the fact (of life) that my own map may well be inaccurate too and someone else might come up with an even better one)? Do not tell me I have begged any questions. I have not.

5.1.2 Exhausting the Conceptual Space: No Thanks
What is the evidence for the New Induction? What is Stanford’s reference class? How exactly are theories individuated? Consider, as an example, gravitational theories. One could argue that, if they are understood as broad theories, there have been just three of them: Aristotelian, Newtonian and Einsteinian. Is the inductive evidence of two instances enough to warrant Stanford’s inductive conclusion? Alternatively, one could argue that though there is a genuine shift from Aristotelian to Newtonian theories, the shift from Newton to Einstein is, by hindsight, not too radical concerning the space of possibilities. Since Newtonian theories can be reformulated within the general four-dimensional framework of General Relativity, there may be a sense in which the conceptual space of possibilities of Newton’s theory may overlap with the conceptual space of General Relativity. In any case, one could argue that as science grows, theories acquire some stable characteristics (they become more precise, the evidence for them is richer and varied, they are more severely tested, they are incorporated into larger theoretical schemes and others) such that a) they can no longer be grouped together with older theories that were much cruder or underdeveloped to form a uniform inductive basis for pessimism, and b) they constrain the space of alternative possibilities well enough to question the reach of unconceived alternatives predicament. 
In a rather amazing move, Stanford tries to neutralise these worries by shifting his attention from theories to theorists. He claims that his arguments intend to show that “present theorists are no better able to exhaust the space of serious well-confirmed possible theoretical explanations of the phenomena than past theorists have turned out to be” (2006, 44). There is a sense in which this kind of argument is question-begging. It assumes that the conceptual space of theories that can possess several empirical and theoretical virtues is inexhaustible, or that we have made no progress at all in delimiting it substantially. I see no argument for this except for the claim that every time scientists come up with a new theory, they start from scratch. But this would simply beg the question. The New Induction does not imply that the conceptual space of theories is inexhaustible; rather, if its conclusion is to follow at all, it presupposes it. At best, we are here in a stand-off. Stanford needs an independent argument to show that the conceptual space of theories is inexhaustible and the realist needs an independent argument that every new theory in science is not a false start. There is no advantage on either side. But let’s leave this to the one side.
Focusing the problem on theorists—that is on human scientists, that is on cognitive creatures of the sort we are—is, I think, particularly unfortunate. Suppose Stanford’s claim is true. What does it show? It reports an interesting psychological fact: something about our cognitive faculties or constitution. Dogs are not expected to understand high-level theories; it’s a fact of life for them. But we are not concluding this important fact for dogs from an induction on their past failure to understand high-level theories. We have a theoretical explanation of this—we study their cognitive life not because we want to improve it (thought we might) but because we want to understand why they have the limitations they do etc. We are not like dogs in this respect—we think we understand a lot about the workings of nature and that we have made progress in this understanding. We even have theories as to how this understanding is possible etc. Would (or should) we change all this on the basis of the New Induction? Would we base a severe cognitive limitation on such flimsy evidence? Wouldn’t we require an explanation and/or account of this shortcoming? Actually, it seems that any decent explanation of how this cognitive limitation occurs would rely heavily on theoretical entities and theories of the sort Stanford thinks there are unconceived alternatives and hence, by Stanford’s lights, we would not even be entitled to such an explanation—we would have to base a great fact about us and our cognitive prospects on a simple enumerative induction which faces obvious problems, especially when there is no clear reference class as its basis. 
I do not want to buttress enumerative induction. But think of the following situation. Stanford invites us to accept a fundamental cognitive shortcoming on the basis of an enumerative induction. In effect, he invites us to distrust the eliminative methods followed by scientists because they (qua theorists) “are not well suited to exhausting the kinds of spaces of serious alternative theoretical possibilities” (2006, 45). But hasn’t Stanford undermined himself? Is he not in the same predicament? It might be the case that he occupies a position in which there is some serious (and hitherto unconceived) alternative explanation of the fact that scientists have tended to occupy a position in which there are unconceived, but at least as well-confirmed, theories. In this case, he is not entitled to endorse his own conclusion. Here again, the answer is not to shift the burden of proof to the opponents (cf. 2006, 46). To make his claim credible, Stanford must show that it is not subject to the kind of predicament that other theorists are supposed to be. It is not enough to say that we do not have “any clear reason to distrust” the conclusion of the New Induction—we need a positive reason to trust it and this, by Stanford’s own lights, must be such that the space of alternative hitherto unconceived explanations has been exhausted.
Let’s again forget about all this and take it as an established fact the scientists are poor conceivers of alternative theories. If we were to be told this fact outside the confines of the realism debate, the first thing we should all insist on, I think, is that we must do something about it. When someone is poor in solving mathematical problems, we train them better. In a similar fashion, we (that is, cognitive scientists or whoever else is interested) should try to improve the scientists’ ability to conceive alternatives—perhaps by having classes of creative imagination where they devise radical alternative theories at random and then test them severely). Leaving the half-joke aside, the problem of unconceived alternatives, if it is a problem at all, is not a problem for realism in particular. It is a general problem for epistemology. Given that there is no deductive link between evidence and theory, it is always possible that there are unconceived alternatives and hence the issue is under what conditions we are entitled to talk about justification and knowledge. This is a normative issue and should be dealt with independently of the realism debate. Surely no-one would seriously maintain (nowadays at least) that justification (and knowledge) requires deductive proof; or elimination of all but one possible theories or explanations or what have you. Even Stanford talks about serious and plausible alternatives. He takes it that the problem of unconceived alternatives does not pose problems in inferences in which the “grasp of the plausible alternatives is indeed exhaustive” (2006, 38). I cannot say much on this. Suffice it to say that no-one has a privileged access to what the plausible alternatives are and when (and whether) they have been exhausted. It’s best if we leave this kind of judgement to scientists. If we criticise them on the grounds that they are poor conceivers of plausible alternatives, we had better have a good theory of what makes an alternative plausible and when the plausible alternatives have (or have not) been exhausted.

5.1.3 Balancing two Kinds of Evidence
The fact is that when we think about scientific theories and what they assume about the world we need to balance two kinds of evidence. The first is whatever evidence there is in favour (or against) a specific scientific theory. This evidence has to do with the degree on confirmation of the theory at hand. It is, let us say, first-order evidence, say about electrons and their having negative charge or about the double helix structure of the DNA and the like. First-order evidence is typically what scientists take into account when they form an attitude towards a theory. It can be broadly understood to include some of the theoretical virtues of the theory at hand (parsimony and the like)—of the kind that typically go into plausibility judgements associated with assignment of prior probability to theories. These details do not matter here. The significant point is that first-order evidence relates to specific scientific theories and is a major determinant of judgements concerning the confirmation of the theory. The second kind of evidence (let’s call it second-order evidence) comes from the past record of scientific theories and/or from meta-theoretical (philosophical) considerations that have to do with the reliability of scientific methodology. It concerns not particular scientific theories but science as a whole. (Some) past theories, for instance, were supported by (first-order) evidence, but were subsequently abandoned; or some scientific methods work reliably in certain domains but fail when they are extended to others. This second-order evidence feeds claims such as those that motivate the Pessimistic Induction, or the New Induction, or (at least partly) the underdetermination of theories by evidence. Actually, this second-order evidence is multi-faceted—it is negative (showing limitations and shortcomings) as well as positive (showing how learning from experience can be improved). The problem, a key problem I think, is how these two kinds of evidence are balanced.​[8]​ 
	And they need to be balanced. For instance, the way I see it, the situation with the pessimistic induction is this. There is first-order evidence for a belief P (or a theory T). At the same time, there is second-order evidence for the (likely) falsity of a belief corpus S, which includes P (or for the claim that beliefs of type P have been shown to be false). The presence of second-order evidence does not show that P is false. Yet, it is said to undermine the warrant for P (by undermining the warrant for the corpus in which P is embedded). The question then is: are there reasons for P that override the second-order evidence against S, which in its turn undermines P? This cannot be settled in the abstract—that is without looking into the details of the case at hand. To prioritise second-order evidence is as dogmatic as to turn a blind eye to it. My own strategy (I should say in passing) has been to show that there can be first-order reasons for believing in P (based mostly on the P’s  contribution to the successes of S) that can defeat the second-order reasons PI offers against P. 
Critics of realism have tended to put a premium on the negative second-order evidence. But one has to be careful here. An uncritical prioritisation of second-order evidence might well undermine the intended position of the critic of realism. The second-order evidence feeds the very same methods that scientists have employed, based on first-order evidence, for the assessment of their theories. By drawing a conclusion that undermines the credibility of scientific theories, it may well undermine the credentials of this conclusion. PI again: it might be seen as a challenge to the reliability of the method employed to warrant belief in certain propositions, say P. But then the very conclusion of PI is undermined if it is taken to be based on the very method whose reliability PI has undermined. 
In Stanford’s case, the premium is put on the inductive evidence that scientists are poor conceivers of alternative explanations. Actually, the premium seems so high that Stanford disregards the first-order evidence there is in favour of scientific theories. More accurately put, Stanford allows this evidence to be taken into account only in the cases where (it is justifiedly believed that) there are no plausible alternatives. This may well have things the wrong way around. The justification of the belief that it is unlikely that there are (plausible) alternatives to a given theory is surely a function of the degree of confirmation of theory. It is only by totally disregarding this first-order evidence that Stanford is able to make the justification of the belief that it is unlikely that there are (plausible) alternatives to a given theory solely a function of whatever second-order evidence there is for or against the conceivability record of scientists. One can easily envisage the following situation. Evidence e supports theory T. Hitherto unconceived theory T’ is at least as well confirmed as T. T’ is proposed and replaces T. T’ is further confirmed by evidence e’. The support of T’ is so strong (T’ is so well confirmed) that it becomes pointless to question it and to envisage serious and plausible unconceived rivals. To claim that this kind of scenario is unlikely is to claim either that theories are not really confirmable by the evidence or that their degree of confirmation can never be strong enough to outrun whatever evidence there is for the poor conceivability predicament. Both claims are implausible. In fact, the (first-order) evidence for a theory might be so diverse and varied that, by anyone’s methodological standards, supports the theory more strongly than the simple (second-order) evidence that supports the poor conceivability predicament. 

5.2 Contextualist Instrumentalism
Stanford’s instrumentalism is very sophisticated and liberal. It is a position fully immersed within the realist framework—at least this part of it that I have characterised as the phenomenology of science. Stanford accepts that predictions are theory-driven and that they involve theoretical descriptions of whatever is predicted—being observable or unobservable. He puts no special epistemic weight on the observable-unobservable distinction. He takes it that our understanding of the world is theoretical “all the way down” (2006, 202); that theories are our best conceptual tools for thinking about nature (cf. 2002, 207). In fact, his point of view is not instrumentalism tout court. According to his core characterisation of neo-instrumentalism, theories are predictive and inferential tools, but the inferences they licence—relying indispensably on theoretical descriptions—are not from observables to observables but “from states of affairs characterised in terms we can strictly and literally believe to other such states of affairs” (2006, 203-4). In other words, Stanford’s instrumentalism relies on a body of strict and literal beliefs that form the basis on which the reliability of the theories as instruments for inference and prediction is examined. But this body should, emphatically, not be associated with more traditional commitments to observables or to sensations and the like. How is it, then, to be circumscribed? 
Here is where some back-pedalling starts. Instrumentalists have always taken it to be the case that no matter how attractive and useful theories might be, their ‘cash value’ has to do with what they say about the macro-world of experience. This is, in essence, what Husserl called the ‘life-world’, which he took it to be the ‘pregiven’ world we live in, i.e., the “actually intuited, actually experienced and experienceable world” (1970, 50). The content of this world might be understood narrowly or broadly (as Husserl understood it). Be that as it may, the point is that the content of this world is supposed to be accessed independently of theories. This is, actually, Stanford’s thought too. He takes it that there is a part of the world to which there is “some independent route of epistemic access” (2006, 199). To be more precise, Stanford claims that some parts of the world can be understood in terms of theory towards which there is no (cannot be) instrumentalist stance and these parts of the world (so characterised) can be the benchmark against which the reliability of instrumentally understood theories is checked. Hence, this talk of independent epistemic access does not imply theory-free access. It implies theory-driven access, but by means of theories that are (believed to be) true. This, Stanford thinks, allows us to identify those “concrete consequences of a theory [that] can be grasped independently of the theory” and hence to “specify the beliefs about the world to which we remain committed once we recognize that we are not epistemically entitled to believe in a particular theory” (2006, 198). Stanford is aware that for this line of argument to work, the theories that provide the independent epistemic route to some parts of the world must not be subject to the unconceived alternatives problem. So he proceeds in two steps. The first is to argue that ‘the hypothesis of bodies of common sense’, viz., that common sense ontology of middle-sized physical objects, is immune to the unconceived alternatives predicament. This is supposed to be so because there is no historical record of finding serious unconceived alternatives to it. The second step is to argue that this ‘hypothesis of bodies of common sense’ is not, in all probability, the only serious sound theory that will remain available to the instrumentalist. More specifically, he tries to show that several low- or middle-level theories that involve a good deal of explanatory sophistication won’t be challenged by unconceived alternatives.  
This kind of defence of instrumentalism makes it, I think, more credible. In a way, it makes the realist-instrumentalist debate more local and less polarised. The focus is shifted to particular theories and to whether or not they fall victims to the unconceived alternatives problem. We may then think of Stanford’s instrumentalism as being contextualist: the context determines whether the appropriate stance towards a theory is realist or instrumentalist. But this may be too quick. After all, Stanford has supposedly unveiled a massive shortcoming of theorists, viz., that they are poor conceivers of alternative explanations. And it’s not clear, to say the least, whether the issue of poor conceivability can be dealt in a contextual (or piecemeal) way. 
Let me state a number of problems that Stanford’s instrumentalism faces. First, it is unfortunate, I think, that it is based on the presence of a body of strict and literally true beliefs. I doubt there are any such beliefs and if there are, they are not very interesting. Most beliefs of the common sense—those that are supposed to form the independent epistemic route to the part of the world the instrumentalist is interested in—are neither literally true, nor strict and precise. Is the surface of the pool table flat? Well, it depends. Is the height of John 1,73? Close enough. Is the earth round? FAPP. Is the sea-water blue? Not quite. Is whale a fish? Not really. Do unsupported bodies fall to the ground? Yes, but. Does aspirin cause headache relief? It’s very likely. This is just a figurative way to make the point. And the point is forceful, I think. Common sense is not a theory—let alone a theory towards which we can have a stance of strict and literal belief. Many terms and predicates we use in our commonsensical description of the world are vague and imprecise. Gaining independent epistemic access to the very entities assumed by the common sense requires leaving behind (at least partly) the common-sense framework. Second, is the hypothesis of common bodies immune to the problem of unconceived alternatives? Not really. Let’s forget about phenomenalism and the like—for the sake of the argument. The biggest—at some point unconceived—alternative to the hypothesis of common bodies is science itself. Well, we might not think of science as a rival to common sense. But it is not exactly continuous with it either. Science revises some of the categories by means of which we think of common bodies. The table is not solid (at least there is a well-defined sense in which it is not); colours are not irreducible phenomenal qualities etc. Arguably, the scientific framework has replaced the framework of the common sense (this is the Copernican turn we have already spoken about). Third, Stanford, I think, gets the contrast wrong. The contrast is not common bodies vs calorific molecules, circular inertia, electrons, strings and the like. The contrast should be between common bodies and theoretical entities (meaning, assumed constituents of common bodies). And the relevant point is that the hypothesis of theoretical entities (the realist framework, that is) has no serious and plausible unconceived alternatives. Hence, by Stanford’s own light, this should be quite secure. 
There is a more general problem with Stanford’s strategy to which I want to turn my attention now. Suppose he is right in what he says about the hypothesis of common bodies and the network of strict and literally true beliefs we have concerning common bodies. Stanford’s strategy is overly conservative. It favours rather elementary theories (or schemes). And the irony is that it is known that the favoured theories are elementary, for otherwise there would be no motivation (acknowledged by Stanford’s instrumentalism too) to advance more sophisticated theories (like proper scientific theories) so as to improve our understanding of the very objects assumed by the elementary theories. There is an issue of motivation, then: Why try to devise theories? If the common sense framework is in place and consists of a body of (strict and true beliefs), why not stay there? The answer, of course, is that we know that this framework admits of corrections and that scientific theories correct this framework (as well as their predecessors). This is now commonplace: science is not just piled upon common sense; it adds to it and it corrects it. What perhaps Husserl did not consider when he aimed to show the priority of the life-world over the scientific image, Stanford and everybody else now have taken to heart (cf. 2006, 201). But then there is an issue of explanation—and I will phrase it in very general terms: if newer theories correct the observations, predictions, commitments etc. of their predecessors, they cannot just be more reliable instruments than their predecessors—this would not explain why the corrections should be trusted and be used as a basis for further theoretical developments. 
This last line of thought might be pressed in several ways (including an explanatory argument against strict instrumentalism), but the most promising one in this context is the following. Assume there is a network of strict and literally true beliefs on which we start our endeavours. As science grows, there are two options. The first is that this network does not change—no more strict and literally true beliefs are added to it as a result of the scientific theorising, theory testing etc. This would render bells and whistles all this talk about the indispensability of scientific theorising. The whole spirit of Stanford’s neo-instrumentalism would be violated. The second option (rightly favoured by Stanford himself) is that the network of strict and literally true beliefs is enlarged—more stuff is added when new theories are advanced, accepted, tested and the like. Recall, that Stanford holds no brief for the observable/unobservable distinction and does not restrict his realist stance to simple empirical laws and generalisations. What happens then? Every new theory will enlarge the domain that is interpreted realistically (literal and strict belief). So every successor theory will have more realistic (less instrumentally understood) content than its predecessor. As this process continues (or has continued in the actual history of science), one would expect that at least some parts of the theory that Stanford treats as instrumentally reliable will become so involved in the interpretation of the realistic part that they won’t be doubted without doubting the realistic part too. I take it that this is the case with the atomic hypothesis, nowadays. But the point is very general. And it is that this kind of neo-instrumentalist image of science might well undermine itself and allow realism to spread indefinitely. 
Well, Stanford might well claim that realism will never spread to high-level and fundamental theories. He does admit that there are cases in which the available evidence constrains the space of competing available explanations—he argues, for instance that the possibility that amoebas do not exist is ruled out—but he also insists that there are contexts—mostly having to do with fundamental physics—in which the evidence will never rule out alternative competing explanations. Perhaps, what we have already said in relation to the unconceived alternatives predicament is enough to make it plausible that there is no principled difference between being committed, say, to the reality of amoebas and being committed to the reality of atoms. If scientists are poor conceivers, why should we think that they can succeed with amoebas but not with atoms? 
The case of atoms is particularly instructive. Peter Achinstein (2002) has argued that irrespective of the prospects of finding a general argument for realism (such as the no-miracles argument), there is plenty of evidence—actually a quite compelling argument—to accept the reality of atoms. This has come mostly from the work of the experimentalist Jean Perrin. Part of Achinstein’s strategy is to show that Perrin did consider and eliminate a number of alternative potential explanations of certain phenomena. This strategy capitalises on what I called above ‘first-order evidence’ for a scientific theory. Clearly, part of the weight of the evidence in favour of a theory is carried by the process of eliminating alternative potential explanations. Stanford’s point against Achinstein is that we can reasonably doubt Perrin’s hypothesis because we might doubt his ability to exhaust the space of alternative explanations, “without being able to specify a particular alternative that he has failed to consider” (2006, 40). This kind of point is multiple unfortunate. It is so sweeping (it talks about exhaustion of the conceptual space and it considers it enough that there might be alternative explanations, even if we cannot specify any), that it undercuts any claim to knowledge whatever—common bodies and amoebas and dinosaurs go the way of Perrin’s atoms. 
	Ultimately, Stanford’s instrumentalist—like many other instrumentalists—uses double standards in confirmation. The typical strategy here is this: the content of a theory is split into two parts—let’s call them the OK-assertions and the not-OK-assertions respectively. This partition can be made on several grounds, but typically it is made along the lines of empirical vs theoretical or observable vs unobservable. The OK-assertions are confirmable and confirmed by the evidence. But then the claim is made (or implied) that the principles of confirmation that concern the OK-assertions are not transferable to the not-OK-assertions. Stanford seems to be in a worse predicament here because he allows (in fact he requires) that some theories (and some claims about unobservables) are strictly and literally believed. If this kind of claim (leaving aside the flaws we have already noted) has a tint to normativity (that is, if it is to allow room for issues concerning the justification of belief), Stanford has to show that the ways in which the beliefs he allows (the OK-assertions) are confirmed are radically different from the ways in which the non-OK assertions confront the relevant evidence. No such case has been made. In fact, the very motivation for double standards in the theory of confirmation is deeply problematic. There is plenty of reason to think that the very same principles and methods are implicated in the confirmation of both the OK-parts and the not-OK parts. In other words, the very distinction between the OK-parts and the not-OK parts of a scientific theory is suspect. I leave the elaboration of this point for the appendix in which I discuss in some detail Reichenbach’s argument against the double standards in confirmation. 

6. Ti(a)na and Contextualism Revisited
The extended discussion of Stanford’s neo-instrumentalism has, hopefully, brought home a point with the acronym Ti(a)na: There is (almost) no alternative—to the realist framework, of course. The qualification ‘almost’ is needed for three reasons: first, because constructive empiricism may well be attractive to some empiricists; second, because there may be further neo-instrumentalist views in the future that may prove to be more viable; and third, because—as we have stressed, hopefully, enough—there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist framework. 
Stanford’s neo-instrumentalism has been motivated by the same spirit that has motivated much of instrumentalism, viz. an attitude towards science based on humility and modesty. We may well think of the problem of unconceived alternatives as pointing towards humility and modesty: in science, more or less every hypothesis is tentative and subject to revision and even abandonment. But we have also seen that empiricism need not defy adoption of the full realist framework. Empiricism and realism can co-habit in a space whose boundaries are carved by the anti-metaphysics attitude of empiricism the anti-instrumentalism attitude of scientific realism. 
	Once we have fallen for Ti(a)na, we can take to heart many of the insights that have motivated contextualist neo-instrumentalism. We can even talk of a contextualist version of scientific realism. But these are simple labels. The important point is that there is room for genuine rapprochement between contextualist instrumentalism scientific realism. The non-negotiable features of this compromise are the following: First, that there should not be double standards in confirmation, based on a supposedly principled distinction between OK-entities and not-OK ones. Second, that there is no absolute privilege conferred on either the first-order or the second-order evidence that is brought to bear on scientific theories. Given this, a variety of stances towards scientific theories might be enunciated, depending on the context—broadly understood. 
	There may be independent and different reasons for treating a theory unrealistically. It might be known to be radically false in that there is massive evidence against its basic posits and explanatory mechanisms—e.g., the Ptolemaic theory. It might be known to be false, but the theory might be such that it gets some really fundamental explanatory mechanisms right (e.g., the Copernican theory). It might be known to be false, even in some fundamental explanatory mechanisms, but the theory has many constituents that played important predictive and explanatory role and have not be shown to false—at least they have been accommodated within subsequent theories (e.g., the Newtonian theory). It might be that a theory is known to be false, not because it gets some really fundamental explanatory mechanisms wrong, but because (as is typically the case) it posits idealised entities—in this case, the theory might well be approximately or by-and-large right if there are determinable and quantifiable respects and degrees in which real-worldly entities match up the theory’s idealised posits. There is no reason to have a blanket attitude towards all these types of theories. Besides, that there may well be an outright instrumentalist attitude towards a certain theory does not imply there cannot be false theories that are genuinely closer to the truth than others (meaning: there are reasons to take them to be false but truthlike, or with truthlike fundamental constituents).  
	The degree of credence attributed to a scientific theory (or to some parts of it) is a function of its degree of confirmation. This requires balancing the first-order evidence there is in favour of a theory with second-order considerations that have to do with the reliability of scientific method, the observed patterns in the history of science and the like. And the weight of the second-order evidence is not necessarily negative. Science is not a random walk. The static picture of scientists’s starting afresh each time a theory is revised or abandoned should be contrasted to a dynamic image, according to which theories improve on their predecessors, explain their successes, incorporate their well-supported constituents and lead to a more well-confirmed (and according to current evidence, truer) description of the deep structure of the world.
	I won’t elaborate on these points here. But it seems to me that if contextualism is taken to heart and if it is dissociated from an attempt to impose philosophically driven dichotomies on the body of scientific theories, we can take science to be a dynamic process which, on balance, has been quite successful in disclosing the deep structure of the world. 

Appendix
In this appendix, I try to cast some fresh light on Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism. The strengths and weaknesses of Reichenbach’s argument reveal exactly what is right and what is wrong in the defence of scientific realism. To put the main points briefly: first, Reichenbach argues against the double standards of confirmation showing that the very same type of probability inference governs acceptance of hypotheses that refer to observable and theoretical entities. Second, he makes it clear that this type of probability inference requires assigning prior probabilities to competing hypotheses and that this assignment is governed by judgements of plausibility. Third, he claims that, in the end of the day, the argument for adopting the realist framework is different from the type of argument that licenses acceptance of hypotheses within the framework.
Reichenbach’s strategy advances in three steps. The first is to find a neutral ground between positivism and realism. This is taken to be the fact that there are non-demonstrative inferential patterns that are accepted by both parties—at least that they are not obviously denied by positivists. This is the original purpose of the famous example with the shadows cast by birds (1938, 108). The idea is simple (and easily generalisable): the shadows of the birds are projected along two perpendicular axes (presumably by a set of vertical light-rays from above the birds and another set of horizontal light-rays from the sides of the birds); the birds are then inferred to be located at the point where the co-ordinates meet. This is clearly a non-demonstrative inference from the shadows to the birds: the shadows are marks of the presence of birds; they could well be there without the birds being present and the birds could well be there without making any marks. Significantly, the birds are observable. It is part of the first step of the strategy that their presence can be identified independently of the inference from the shadows. But the point of the first step is precisely to show that a) it is one thing to talk about an entity and quite another to talk about the external symptoms of its presence (that is, it is one thing to talk about birds and quite another to talk about the shadows); and b) the existence of one type of entity can well be independent of the existence of another, even though the latter can be a (contingent) symptom of the presence of the former. This dual point forms the ground for the legitimacy of a probabilistic inference (which, ultimately, is a causal inference). 
Reichenbach carefully distinguishes between reduction and projection. Projection is a relation between two distinct types of entity such that one type constitutes a symptom, or an effect, of the other type. Reichenbach talks of ‘external elements’ and contrasts them to ‘internal elements’ which are the constituents (or the parts) of a type of entity. A type of entity, then, may well be reduced to its internal elements (constituents) but it is only projected to its external elements (symptoms; effects). Projective judgements are, for Reichenbach, based on probabilistic inference. Reductive positivists of the sort Reichenbach is keen to argue against would not deny the distinction between projection and reduction, but unlike Reichenbach they would aim to analyse the relation between observable and putative unobservable entities along the lines of reduction, where the reductive basis consists of observable entities. But the very opening of the distinction between reduction and projection suggests a different approach: unobservable entities are the constituents of observable ones (that is, observable entities are reducible complexes, whose internal elements are unobservable entities) and observable entities are symptoms (or effects) of unobservable ones (that is, unobservable entities are projective complexes, whose external elements are observable entities). 
What then is the argument for denying that unobservable entities are reducible complexes, that is they are not reduced to observables? In effect, it is a familiar one: talk about unobservable entities has excess content over talk about observable ones; there is no way in which the former can be translated into the latter without loss of content. Reichenbach puts this point in terms of his probability theory of meaning, viz., that a statement about unobservables and a statement about observables do not get the very same probability by every possible observation. (To see this, consider simply the case in which there are unobervables without leaving observable traces.) 
The second step in Reichenbach’s strategy is to remove the condition of observability from the probabilistic inferential pattern discussed in the first step. If the gist of the inferential pattern described in the first step consists in moving from symptoms to causes, that is from external elements to projective complexes, why does it matter whether or not the projective complex (the bird, let us say) is observable or not? Here comes Reichenbach’s famous example of the cubical world, which is an elaboration of the example noted in the first step above. Now, everything is confined within a cube and there are shadows (marks, let’s say) dancing around the walls. Actually, these marks fall under patterns: the movements on the side wall are co-ordinated with movements on the top wall (for the sake of completeness, Reichenbach adds that these marks are shadows of birds that fly outside the cubic world and that the marks on the vertical wall are produced by a complex set of mirrors which projects the shadows of the birds on it). The birds (causes of the shadows) are unobservable—in fact, the laws of nature are such, let us say, that the birds cannot be seen. Still, the inhabitants of the cubic world are in the same epistemic situation as those involved in the first step. The probabilistic inference which takes them from the marks to their causes is blind to the observability or not of causes. (This might not be immediately obvious and, as Reichenbach suggests, it might need a local Copernicus to point that out. But so be it.) 
Reichenbach’s argument has been taken to be based on a common cause principle, viz., that the co-ordination of distinct marks is due to the presence of a common cause. Indeed, Reichenbach says: “He [the local Copernicus] will maintain that the strange correspondence between the two shades of one pair cannot be a matter or chance but that these two shades are nothing but effects caused by one individual thing situated outside the cube within free space” (p. 118). But the surrounding text makes it clear that Reichenbach has a broader probabilistic inference in mind. What matters is that correlations need to be explained; they cannot be a matter of chance; effects need to be projected to their causes. This call for explanation (for denying taking as brute ‘matter of chance’ certain phenomena) underlies Reichenbach’s argument. To see this, let us consider an immediate objection to his view, viz., the kind of inference he has in mind is a non-starter since it generates new content (it infers the existence of unobservable causes—the birds) out of nowhere. To this objection, Reichenbach replies as follows (at least, according to the way I read him): explanation does precisely that; it generates new content by taking us from some external elements to their projective complex. It is highly improbable, as he put it, that strange coincidences are chancy effects and their presence calls for causal explanation (looking for causal connection, as he put it) (see, p. 120-1). 
To modern ears (and I guess to Reichenbach’s ears), this last claim would amount to a call for comparing the likelihoods of two competing hypotheses. More broadly put, Reichenbach’s argument is this (so far): there is an effect e observed; e would be very unlikely if not-H were the case, but e would be very likely if H were the case; hence, H is to be preferred to not-H. Now, Reichenbach talks of probabilities as weights, and an argument such as the above could well capture the weight of evidence, even if it does not tell us to what degree the evidence supports one hypothesis over the other. Besides, we can see how this type of argument can generate new content. How are the relevant likelihoods to be specified? This is done, at least partly, on the basis of analogy. Even if a persistent positivist contrived a hypothesis such that the strange coincidence would become the outcome of a (strange) causal law that did not involve projective complexes (and hence a law that implicated only entities acceptable to the positivists), one could point to the fact that in many other similar cases where strange coincidences were present, there had been a causal connection among them that involved projective complexes (simply put, there had been a common cause). 
But, of course, this kind of argument, based as it in on likelihoods, would be liable to committing the base-rate fallacy. Reichenbach seems to come close to it when he says: “Reflections such as this would incline the physicists to believe in the hypothesis of Copernicus …” (p.121). Yet, he does not commit the fallacy since he is fully aware that the inference he has in mind requires another element, viz., the prior probabilities of the competing hypotheses. Curiously, he relegates this important point to a footnote (under the label “Remark for the mathematician”) (see p.124). And this important point is that one can use Bayes’s rule to specify the posterior probability of a hypothesis given the evidence as a function of the likelihood and the ‘initial probability’ of a hypothesis. More importantly, different prior probabilities make a difference to the posterior probabilities of competing hypotheses, even if the likelihoods are equal. Reichenbach says surprisingly little about the status of prior probabilities: “It is these initial probabilities that are involved in the reflections of the physicist about causal connections” (p.124, ft. 4). But three further points are relevant. First, the overall tone of Reichenbach’s discussion (as well as his theory of probability) suggests that for him the assignment of prior probabilities to competing hypotheses is not just (or mainly) a matter of subjective preferences. Second, the key point that he intends to drive home is that this type of probabilistic inference is overreaching: it allows the justification of hypotheses (by showing how they are confirmed by the evidence) irrespective of whether or not their content is observationally accessible. Third, this type of probabilistic inference “is the basic method of the knowledge of nature” (p. 127) and this is so for everyone—that is, positivists too have to rely on it. 
There is a third step to Reichenbach’s strategy and this is an attempt to generalise the lessons drawn from the second step to the realism-positivism debate in general. Reichenbach’s thought is that the very question of the existence of the external world of physical things as distinct and independent from impressions can be settled along the lines of the second step above. The physical objects of the external world are taken to be projective complexes, with the impressions being external elements of them—that is, signs or marks or effects of their presence. Physical objects can then exist unperceived. The move from step two to step three rests on the assumption that the very same method that is employed in science to accept hypotheses (probabilistic inference) can be employed in defence of scientific realism. But Reichenbach is aware of the problem that this generalisation of the strategy faces, viz., that the choice of an overall framework (say an egocentric framework where things are reduced to classes of impressions or a physicalist framework where impressions are merely effects of independently existing objects) cannot be simply a matter of probability. This is because we cannot talk of the probability of a framework as a whole, especially because the very idea of assigning probabilities to competing hypotheses within a framework (as in the second step of the strategy) requires that the framework is already in place. Differently put, the very fact that probabilities are assigned to hypotheses about theoretical entities requires that the prior adoption of a framework within which such hypotheses are formulable and evaluable, viz., a realist framework. It’s a different matter, of course, how are prior probabilities are to be assigned after the framework is adopted. Here, Reichenbach’s interpretation of probability as limiting relative frequency might betray him, since as Feigl (1950) were quick to note, it would require some estimation of the actual success of inferences from observable entities to hypotheses concerning unobservable entities—and, clearly, there is no independent assessment of the latter. Reichenbach, as we have seen, thought that the very issue of observability is spurious: the probabilistic inferential pattern is blind to whether or not the inferred hypothesis is about observable or not. Hence for him, the relevant reference class for assigning probabilities might well be inferences from correlations to common causes (that is, that, by and large, such correlations admit of further explanation by reference to third factors), irrespective of whether the common causes are observable or not. But though this thought is correct, it does not avoid the main objection, viz., that the adoption of the realist framework is not a matter of probabilistic inference. 
Reichenbach goes on to divide the problem into two components—the first is the adoption of a framework as the result of a free (that is non-dictated by evidence or a priori considerations) decision; the second is the investigation of the adopted framework by looking into its fruits. This consequentialist move is, for Reichenbach, a way to justify the choice of the framework—especially by showing, in a comparative fashion, that one framework is better suited than another to achieve certain aims or to satisfy certain desiderata. 
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^1	  FT ON SELLARS HERE
^2	  It is not my intention to think of the realist framework as a linguistic framework, and in particular as a framework within which some truths are analytic and others synthetic. Nor do I intend to associate this talk about the adoption of the framework with Carnap’s distinction between external and internal question (though I do think that Carnap’s distinction can be read as highlighting the view that the adoption of the framework is not based on the same kind of arguments that the adoption of assertions within the framework are based). Speaking somewhat loosely, the realist framework is an ontic framework—one that posits theoretical entities. And the issue of adopting a framework is the issue of which ontology to adopt, as Quine has put it. 
^3	  A recent paper which casts fresh light on the role of the no-miracles argument in the realism debate is Ghins (2001).
^4	  The way I read it, the no-miracles argument is a philosophical argument that aims to defend the reliability of scientific methodology in producing approximately true theories and hypotheses (see my 1999, 78-81). Its conclusion proceeds in two steps. The first step is that we should accept as (approximately) true the theories that are implicated in the (best) explanation of the instrumental reliability of first-order scientific methodology. The second step is that since, typically, these theories have been arrived at by means of IBE, IBE is reliable. The no-miracles argument is not just a generalisation over the scientists’ abductive inferences. Although itself an instance of the method that scientists employ, it aims at a much broader target: to defend the thesis that Inference to the Best Explanation, (that is, a type of inferential method) is reliable. What makes the no-miracles argument distinctive as an argument for realism is that it defends the achievability of theoretical truth. The second step of the conclusion is supposed to secure this. The background scientific theories, which are deemed approximately true, have themselves been arrived at by abductive reasoning. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that abductive reasoning is reliable: it tends to generate approximately true theories.
^5	  I do not treat fictionalism separately because I think it is a (natural) way to develop either constructive empiricism or error-theoretic instrumentalism. The driving force behind fictionalism is not so much the idea that some purportedly real entities are useful fictions as the idea that commitment to the reality of some purported entities is dispensable (that is, that either the question of their reality can be bracketed or there is no question of their reality). These two claims correspond to constructive empiricism and error-theoretic instrumentalism respectively.
^6	  The details of this argument are too well-known to be rehearsed here (see my 1999, chapter 5 & 2000). There are a number of objections to this argument (some more serious than others), but my concern here is with Stanford’s objection to it. 
^7	  Stanford (2006, 167-8) ponders a somewhat similar line of thought on behalf of the realist, takes it to be promising, but dismisses it on the grounds that it is unconvincing: it is one potential explanation among others, including Stanford’s own, viz., that our judgements about the truth of past theories and our judgements about their successes have a common source. I fail to feel the weight of this point. Surely, Stanford’s potential explanation is external: it tells us something about the source of the scientists’ (or of the realists’) judgements, viz. that it this source is current theory. Even if true, this line is surely compatible with in an internal potential explanation of the emergence of a stable network of theoretical assertions along the realist lines, viz. along the lines that being part of this network is best explained by being truthlike. 
^8	  Both PI and NI are raised within the realist framework. They are based on a discrepancy between two kinds of evidence (first-order and second-order) that there is for the reality of theoretical entities. They do not challenge the realist frame; at best, they challenge the legitimacy of belief in the reality of certain entities or the truth of certain theories.
